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COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS OF 
FINANCIAL BENEFITS AS A RESULT 
OF A SHORTENING OF LIFE
SIRKO HARDER*
Personal injury resulting from a civil wrong may reduce the injured 
person’s life expectation. An injured person who would have worked 
during the lost years has lost earning capacity, which is compensable 
if judgment is obtained in the injured person’s lifetime. An injured 
person who would not have worked during the lost years (in particular 
a retiree) has not lost remuneration for work done during the lost 
years but may have lost other income that would have been received 
during the lost years, for example a pension. This article investigates 
whether the loss of such other income should be compensable if 
judgment is obtained in the injured person’s lifetime. The focus is 
on the loss of pension payments, which was considered by the High 
Court of Australia in Amaca Pty Ltd v Latz (2018) 356 ALR 1.
I   INTRODUCTION
Personal injury resulting from a civil wrong may reduce the injured person’s life 
expectation. A shortening of life causes pecuniary loss where, in the period in 
which the injured person would have lived if uninjured but will now not live 
(hereafter the ‘lost years’), the injured person would have obtained pecuniary 
benefits of a value exceeding the amount the injured person would have spent on 
his or her maintenance.
In the past, the average life expectation of people in Australia and many other 
countries did not exceed the pension age by much if at all.1 Thus, the shortening 
of life as a result of personal injury usually meant the shortening of the injured 
person’s working life. An injured person who would have worked in the lost 
years suffers loss of earnings or, more precisely, loss of earning capacity. Once 
a significant number of people had started to earn more than what they needed 
* Reader, Sussex Law School. I would like to thank Emeritus Professor Harold Luntz AO, Michael J Lee 
and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I would like to thank 
Michael J Lee also for his assistance in retrieving statistical data. Any errors are my own.
1 In 1920–22, the life expectancy at birth in Australia was 59.2 for males and 63.3 for females: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population Statistics (Catalogue No 3105.0.65.001, 18 September 
2014) Table 6.1. The pension age in Australia has never been below 60.
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for their basic maintenance, claims for loss of earning capacity in the lost years 
emerged. It has long been recognised in Australia that such loss is compensable,2 
although statutes in all Australian jurisdictions now exclude recovery where the 
claim is brought not in the injured person’s lifetime but after the injured person’s 
death on behalf of the estate.3
In Australia and many other countries, the average life expectation of people 
has risen significantly in recent decades,4 and even though the pension age has 
been raised,5 people are now expected to live on average a number of years after 
reaching the pension age. On reaching the pension age, people usually wind 
down their engagement in remunerative work, and many retirees do not work 
for a number of years before their death. Where an injury shortens the period 
that the injured person is expected to spend in retirement (without working) but 
does not shorten the injured person’s working life, the injured person has not lost 
remuneration for work done during the lost years.6 But the injured person may 
well have lost other income (hereafter ‘non-remuneration income’) in the lost 
years.7 Most retirees do have non-remuneration income. In Australia, the most 
prevalent sources of income for retirees are the superannuation pension and the 
means-tested age pension.8
Cases in which a person lost a superannuation pension and/or an age pension 
because of the shortening of life have come before Australian courts since the 
early 2000s. They have all involved mesothelioma, which is caused by exposure 
to asbestos but occurs only years, sometimes decades, after the exposure took 
place.9 People who were exposed to asbestos at work often develop mesothelioma 
only shortly before or even after reaching retirement age. The first cases of this 
type were finally decided by the New South Wales Dust Diseases Tribunal, which 
2 The High Court recognised it in Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94 (‘Skelton’).
3 The provisions are discussed below at Part III(B).
4 In 2015–17, the life expectancy at birth in Australia was 80.5 for males and 84.6 for females: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Life Tables, States, Territories and Australia, 2015–2017 (Catalogue No 3302.0.55.001, 
30 October 2018) Table 1.9.
5 The age at which an eligible Australian resident may claim the age pension depends upon gender and date of 
birth. It is 67 years for all persons born on or after 1 January 1957: Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 23(5A)–
(5D).
6 In this article, ‘remuneration for work’ denotes the salary or wages of an employee and the profit or profit 
share obtained by the owner or co-owner of a business in return for his or her labour.
7 In this article, ‘non-remuneration income’ denotes any income other than remuneration for work done during 
the lost years.
8 In 2016–17, over 2 million people received the age pension, and about 870,000 retirees in Australia had 
a superannuation pension as their main source of personal income at retirement: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Retirement and Retirement Intentions, Australia, July 2016 to June 2017 (Catalogue No 6238.0, 
18 December 2017) Tables 6.1, 7.1. The key features of the two types of pension are outlined below at Part II. 
For the history of the two pension systems in Australia, see Terry Carney, ‘The Future of Welfare Law in a 
Changing World: Lessons from Australia and Singapore’ [2010] (July) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
22, 26–9.
9 The number of new reported cases of mesothelioma in Australia has steadily increased since 1982. It was 710 
in 2017: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, ‘Mesothelioma in Australia 2017’ (Media Release CAN 
121, 13 November 2018) 2.
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held that the loss of a superannuation pension as a result of a shortening of life is 
compensable,10 but the loss of the age pension is not.11 The question of whether the 
loss of either pension is compensable came before the High Court of Australia in 
Amaca Pty Ltd v Latz (‘Latz (HCA)’).12
Mr Latz contracted terminal malignant mesothelioma, which had been caused by 
his exposure to asbestos produced by the defendant’s predecessor. The defendant 
was found liable. When the mesothelioma was diagnosed, Mr Latz was 69 years 
old. He was retired and in receipt of a partial age pension and — as a former 
employee of the State of South Australia — a superannuation pension to be 
paid by that State pursuant to pt 5 of the Superannuation Act 1988 (SA). On his 
death, both pensions were to cease, and his domestic partner, Ms Taplin, was to 
receive from his superannuation fund a reversionary pension equal to two thirds 
of his superannuation pension.13 The mesothelioma had reduced Mr Latz’s life 
expectation by 16 years, and he claimed (among others) damages for the loss of 
the two pensions in the lost years. The trial judge awarded damages for the loss 
of both pensions; his Honour deducted the amount of basic living expenses that 
Mr Latz would have incurred in the lost years, but did not make a deduction on 
account of Ms Taplin’s reversionary pension.14
In the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, Blue J and Hinton 
J held that Mr Latz could recover for the loss of both pensions, but that Ms 
Taplin’s reversionary pension should be deducted.15 Stanley J, dissenting, took 
the view that the loss of neither pension was compensable, but that, if the loss of 
the superannuation pension was compensable, Ms Taplin’s reversionary pension 
should not be deducted.16
In the High Court, proceedings were expedited in order that a decision be given 
in Mr Latz’s lifetime. The orders were made first, and reasons published a month 
later.17 It was a split decision. The majority (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and 
Edelman JJ) held that the loss of the superannuation pension was compensable, 
that Ms Taplin’s reversionary pension was to be deducted, and that the loss of the 
age pension was not compensable. On the last two issues, their Honours’ reasons 
are rather short and do not fully explain the basis of their decision, which may be 
10 Lynch v Amaca Pty Ltd [2004] NSWDDT 1, [8]–[16] (Curtis J) (‘Lynch’). See also Roberts v Amaca Pty Ltd 
[2009] NSWDDT 28, [64]–[72] (Curtis J): loss of United Kingdom superannuation pension is compensable.
11 Dib v Amaca Pty Ltd [2017] NSWDDT 6, [166]–[170] (Russell J).
12 (2018) 356 ALR 1 (‘Latz (HCA)’).
13 Superannuation Act 1988 (SA) s 38(1)(a). Ms Taplin was Mr Latz’s ‘putative spouse’ as defined in s 4A.
14 Latz v Amaca Pty Ltd [2017] SADC 56, [95]–[118] (Gilchrist J) (‘Latz (SADC)’).
15 Amaca Pty Ltd v Latz (2017) 129 SASR 61, 85–8 [97]–[117] (Blue J), 116–20 [248]–[262] (Hinton J) (‘Latz 
(SASCFC)’).
16 Ibid 93–103 [154]–[183].
17 The reasons were published on 13 June 2018. Mr Latz died on 29 June 2018: ‘LATZ, Anthony Carl’, The 
Advertiser (online, 3 July 2018) <tributes.adelaidenow.com.au/notice/6438146950561792/view>.
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due to the expedited nature of the proceedings. The minority (Kiefel CJ and Keane 
J), who provided more extensive reasons, took the view that the loss of neither 
pension was compensable. Their Honours did not address the deductibility of Ms 
Taplin’s reversionary question, calling for a legislative solution.18
This article discusses the issues that arose in Latz and are bound to arise in 
similar cases in the future. It will scrutinise the reasons provided by the various 
judges in the High Court and the lower courts in Latz. Part II discusses whether 
a pension is intrinsically connected to earning capacity, for if it was, it would 
be uncontroversial that the loss of pension payments is compensable. Part III 
discusses whether all pecuniary losses resulting from a shortening of life should 
be compensable, or whether only loss of earning capacity should be compensable. 
Part IV discusses whether the reversionary pension that a dependant of the 
contributor is expected to obtain on the latter’s death should be deducted from the 
damages for the loss of the contributor’s superannuation pension. Part V contains 
a conclusion.
II   IS A PENSION INTRINSICALLY LINKED 
TO EARNING CAPACITY?
As mentioned before, loss of earning capacity in the lost years is compensable 
if judgment is obtained in the injured person’s lifetime. Thus, if judgment is 
obtained in the injured person’s lifetime, the loss of pension payments in the lost 
years is compensable if the pension is intrinsically connected to earning capacity.
The Australian age pension is not intrinsically connected to earning capacity. 
This view was taken in Latz by Stanley J in the South Australian Full Court,19 
and by both the minority20 and the majority21 in the High Court. The age pension 
can be claimed by every person who has reached pension age, has been resident 
in Australia for a certain period (usually 10 years)22 and does not have assets or 
income above certain thresholds.23 It is irrelevant whether the person has ever had 
earning capacity or has ever exercised earning capacity in Australia.
Before discussing the superannuation pension, it may be useful to outline the 
key features of the Australian superannuation system. Employers in Australia are 
generally obliged to pay a certain percentage of an employee’s gross salary (9.5% 
18 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 9 [40].
19 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 97 [162].
20 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 17 [74] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
21 Ibid 24 [115] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
22 The period is shorter in certain circumstances and not required for refugees: Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) 
ss 7, 43.
23 See ibid ss 1064–5.
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at the time of writing)24 into the employee’s superannuation fund.25 On reaching 
a certain age26 (but not generally before), the employee (‘the contributor’) may 
claim superannuation benefits and usually has a choice between obtaining a lump 
sum and obtaining a periodical payment (a ‘superannuation pension’) ceasing 
on death.27 A retired contributor who has obtained the entire superannuation 
benefit in a lump sum can no longer lose any superannuation benefit as a result of 
premature death. In the case of a superannuation pension ceasing on death, the 
premature death of the retired contributor causes the loss of pension payments,28 
although certain dependants may acquire a reversionary pension.29
In Latz (HCA), the majority regarded the superannuation pension as being 
intrinsically connected to earning capacity.30 Their Honours’ chain of reasoning 
is represented by the following statements:
1. ‘The loss of earning capacity has been described as a capital asset — the 
capacity to earn money from the use of personal skills.’31
2. ‘Superannuation benefits, like wages, are the product of the exploitation of 
the claimant’s capital asset.’32
3. ‘In general terms, where a claimant is injured during their working life, what 
is awarded in relation to superannuation benefits is the net present value of 
the court’s best estimate of the fund that the claimant would have had at the 
date of retirement but for the injury’.33
4. ‘Mr Latz’s rights under Pt 5 of the Superannuation Act can be conceptualised, 
as Mr Latz submitted, as delayed remuneration for work that Mr Latz 
has carried out. This asset is intrinsically connected to earning capacity, 
representing, as it does, a species of remuneration — financial rewards from 
24 At the time of writing, the percentage is due to increase to 12% by 2025: Superannuation Guarantee 
(Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) s 19(2) (‘SGAA’).
25 Ibid pt 3. A higher percentage can be contributed, which may generate tax advantages for the employee. The 
details are complex and not relevant for present purposes.
26 The age depends upon the contributor’s date of birth. It is 60 years for persons born after 30 June 1964: see 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.01(2) (definition of ‘preservation age’) 
(‘SIS Regulations’).
27 See generally SIS Regulations (n 26).
28 Unless an amount equal to the lost pension payments becomes payable to the contributor’s estate in excess 
of the amount (if any) that would have been payable to the contributor’s estate in the absence of the life-
shortening injury.
29 The impact of a reversionary pension on the recovery of the loss of the contributor’s own pension is discussed 
below at Part IV.
30 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 19–20 [89], 23 [109] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
31 Ibid 19 [89], citing Government Insurance Office v Johnson [1981] 2 NSWLR 617, 627 (Hutley JA) (‘GIO 
(NSWCA)’).
32 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 21 [94] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
33 Ibid 21 [97] (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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work.’34
5. ‘There is no principled basis for denying Mr Latz compensation for his lost 
superannuation benefit just because the injury or illness which occasioned 
that loss became apparent only after he commenced retirement.’35
The first three propositions are uncontroversial. Considering the context in which 
it is used, the phrase ‘superannuation benefits’ in points 2 and 3 denotes the benefit 
of the superannuation fund increasing as a result of employer contributions (‘pay-
in benefits’). It is uncontroversial that compensation for an employee’s loss of 
earning capacity includes compensation not only for the loss of take-home pay 
but also for the shortfall in the superannuation fund.36
The proposition in point 5 may also be accepted. Here, the phrase ‘superannuation 
benefit’ is used to denote the benefit of receiving money from the superannuation 
fund. The majority was right in saying that the entitlement to recover for the 
loss of superannuation payouts should not depend on whether the injury causing 
the loss became apparent before or after retirement. Nor should it depend upon 
whether the injury occurred before or after retirement. But the issue in Latz was 
not the time at which the injury occurred or became apparent. The issue was 
whether the loss of superannuation payouts should be recoverable at all, even 
where the injury occurred and became apparent before retirement. This was 
concealed by the imprecise use of the phrase ‘superannuation benefit(s)’ for both 
pay-in benefits and payout benefits.
The key step in the majority’s reasoning is point 4. What their Honours were 
saying there is that superannuation payouts are intrinsically connected to earning 
capacity because they constitute ‘delayed remuneration for work’. Their Honours, 
and Mr Latz in his submission, took that phrase from Lord Reid’s speech in Parry 
v Cleaver.37 Lord Reid was discussing the effect of injury on an employee and 
was simply stating that pensionable employment is more valuable to an employee 
than the amount of the take-home pay. His Lordship was concerned with pay-in 
benefits, not payout benefits.
Superannuation payouts can loosely be described as delayed remuneration for 
work because they are the product of the exploitation of earning capacity. However, 
once the entitlement to payments into the superannuation fund has been earned 
(through the provision of labour), earning capacity has been exercised, and any 
34 Ibid 22 [104] (citations omitted).
35 Ibid 22 [105].
36 Damages for a shortfall in the superannuation fund are usually calculated by reference to a certain percentage 
of the amount awarded for the loss of take-home pay: see Harold Luntz and Sirko Harder, Assessment of 
Damages for Personal Injury and Death (LexisNexis, 5th ed, forthcoming) [6.3.7]–[6.3.8].
37 [1970] AC 1, 16 (‘Parry’).
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subsequent event can no longer affect earning capacity,38 but only the ability to 
obtain the fruits of the past exercise of earning capacity.39
The logical consequence of the majority’s view in Latz (HCA) is that loss of 
earning capacity is present whenever a wrong deprives the plaintiff of some 
or all of the fruits of the previous exercise of earning capacity. Loss of earning 
capacity would be present, for example, where an employer wrongfully fails to 
pay the required amount into the employee’s superannuation fund, where the 
managers of a superannuation fund wrongfully diminish the fund assets, or where 
property bought out of remuneration for work is wrongfully damaged. It would 
be a remarkable step to give the concept of loss of earning capacity such a wide 
meaning.
In conclusion, neither the age pension nor the superannuation pension can properly 
be categorised as being intrinsically connected to earning capacity. It does not 
necessarily follow that the loss of pension payments cannot be compensable. 
That would be the consequence only if loss of earning capacity was the only 
type of pecuniary loss resulting from a shortening of life that is and should be 
compensable. Whether this is the case will be discussed next.
III   SHOULD LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY BE 
THE ONLY COMPENSABLE LOSS RESULTING 
FROM A SHORTENING OF LIFE?
A   Compensability of Non-Remuneration 
Income as Default Position
The key question addressed in this article is whether the loss of non-remuneration 
income as a result of a shortening of life should be regarded as a compensable 
head of loss.40 In Amaca Pty Ltd v Latz (‘Latz (SASCFC)’), the majority took the 
view that the compensability of the loss of non-remuneration income followed 
from the principle that the victim of a tort or breach of contract should receive 
compensation in the sum which, so far as money can do, will place that party 
in the same position as if the wrong had not occurred.41 That principle is well-
38 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 97 [162] (Stanley J).
39 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 17 [74] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J). See Parry (n 37) 16 (Lord Reid): ‘a pension is the fruit, 
through insurance, of all the money which was set aside in the past in respect of … past work’.
40 The loss of non-remuneration income will usually be foreseeable, not be too remote and — under the civil 
liability statutes — fall within the scope of the defendant’s liability. For the scope of liability as part of 
the causation inquiry, see Katy Barnett and Sirko Harder, Remedies in Australian Private Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2018) 74–8 [3.4]–[3.17].
41 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 76 [68], 85 [100] (Blue J), 116 [250] (Hinton J).
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established.42 However, the minority in the High Court took the view that the 
compensability of a head of loss is an anterior question: ‘One cannot invoke 
the compensatory principle to identify whether a particular head of damage is 
compensable’.43 For the minority, the compensatory principle was irrelevant to 
the question of compensability, and non-remuneration income could be regarded 
as compensable only if there was a positive reason (such as specific precedent) 
for it.
The minority was correct to say that the compensatory principle is not conclusive 
as to the compensability of a head of loss. If it was, any loss would be compensable. 
Yet some heads of loss are not compensable, although in the tort of negligence this 
is usually framed as the absence of a duty of care.44 For example, in Australian 
law there is no liability in negligence for pure mental harm short of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness.45
However, loss of non-remuneration income is not a novel head of loss. It has been 
compensated outside the context of personal injury. For example, landlords may 
recover damages for the loss of rent resulting from a wrong of the tenant46 or a 
third party,47 and a person entitled to payments out of a trust fund may recover 
compensation for the loss of those payments resulting from a breach of trust by 
the trustee.48 The compensability of the loss of non-remuneration income has 
been recognised in principle, and there needs to be a good reason for making 
an exception in the context of personal injury. The following sections discuss 
whether such a reason may be found in legislation (B), in precedent (C) or in 
policy considerations (D and F). A comparison with the position in English law 
is added (E).
B   The Impact of Legislation
There is no legislation in Australia which expressly or by clear implication 
excludes the right of an injured person whose life expectation has been shortened 
42 Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60, 63 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Manser v Spry (1994) 
181 CLR 428, 434 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ) (‘Manser’); Clark v Macourt 
(2013) 253 CLR 1, 18–19 [59] (Gageler J). See also Butler v Egg and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 
CLR 185, 191 (Taylor and Owen JJ); Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402, 412 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J) 
(‘Todorovic’); Redding v Lee (1983) 151 CLR 117, 133 (Mason and Dawson JJ) (‘Redding’); Johnson v Perez 
(1988) 166 CLR 351, 355 (Mason CJ), 386 (Dawson J); Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 
CLR 64, 116 (Deane J); Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52, 78–9 [81] (Kirby J), 130 [264] (Crennan J).
43 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 10 [41] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
44 See Donal Nolan, ‘Damage in the English Law of Negligence’ (2013) 4(3) Journal of European Tort Law 259, 
264.
45 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 381–2 [193] (Gummow and Kirby JJ), 414 [285] (Hayne J).
46 The Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17, 55–6 (Deane J).
47 Gagner Pty Ltd v Canturi Corporation Pty Ltd (2009) 262 ALR 691, 719 [129] (Campbell JA).
48 Re Murdoch and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 68 ATR 317, 324 [22] (Downes J).
Compensation for the Loss of Financial Benefits as a Result of a Shortening of Life 141
to recover for the loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years.49 But 
there are two sets of statutory provisions that might be said to conflict with a 
right to recover for such loss: the provisions in the civil liability statutes that 
regulate damages for personal injury and the provisions in the survival statutes 
that prevent the estate of a wrongfully killed person from recovering for loss of 
earning capacity or earnings in the lost years.
As a result of the civil liability reform in 2002–04,50 all Australian jurisdictions 
(including the Commonwealth) have provisions limiting the amount of damages 
which in certain cases of personal injury may be awarded for loss of earning 
capacity, loss of earnings or (in an action brought by the dependants of a wrongfully 
killed person) loss of financial support.51 All jurisdictions except the Australian 
Capital Territory have provisions that restrict (in availability and amount)52 or 
completely exclude53 Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages54 (damages in respect of 
gratuitous services provided to the injured person) in certain circumstances. All 
jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory also have provisions which 
increase the discount rate applied in relation to future pecuniary loss from the 
49 In certain cases, the overall amount of damages that can be recovered for any loss, or any pecuniary loss, is 
capped: see, eg, Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) s 31; Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) 
s 93(7)(a) (‘Transport Accident Act (Vic)’); Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 
(Vic) s 340(a) (‘WIRC Act (Vic)’); Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) ss 93F(1), 
93K(5). Such an overall cap would limit recovery for the loss of non-remuneration income.
50 The key purpose of the reform was to lower premiums for public liability insurance: see, eg, New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 May 2002, 2085–6 (Robert Carr, Premier); 
Explanatory Notes, Civil Liability Bill 2003 (Qld) 1–2.
51 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87U (‘CCA’); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 98 (‘CLA 
(ACT)’); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 12 (‘CLA (NSW)’); Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) 
s 4.6 (‘MAI Act (NSW)’); Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 151I (‘Workers Compensation Act 
(NSW)’); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 20 (‘Personal Injuries Act (NT)’); 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 54 (‘CLA (Qld)’); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 54(2)–(3) (‘CLA (SA)’); Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 26(1) (‘CLA (Tas)’); Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas) 
s 22(5) (‘Motor Accidents Act (Tas)’); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 28F (‘Wrongs Act (Vic)’); Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) s 11 (‘CLA (WA)’).
52 CCA (n 51) s 87W; CLA (NSW) (n 51) ss 15–15A; Personal Injuries Act (NT) (n 51) s 23; CLA (Qld) (n 51) s 
59; CLA (SA) (n 51) s 58; CLA (Tas) (n 51) s 28B; Wrongs Act (Vic) (n 51) ss 28IA–28IB; CLA (WA) (n 51) s 
12; Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA) s 3D.
53 MAI Act (NSW) (n 51) ss 4.3(1)(a), 4.5; Workers Compensation Act (NSW) (n 51) s 151G; Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 306E–306H; CLA (Tas) (n 51) s 28C; Transport 
Accident Act (Vic) (n 49) s 93(10)(c); WIRC Act (Vic) (n 49) s 342(b). In addition, damages for ‘attendant care 
services’ are in all jurisdictions excluded for participants in the special statutory compensation schemes for 
certain cases of catastrophic injury: Lifetime Care and Support (Catastrophic Injuries) Act 2014 (ACT) s 
9, Dictionary; Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW) ss 3(1), 5A; Motor Accidents 
(Compensation) Act 1979 (NT) s 4D; National Injury Insurance Scheme (Queensland) Act 2016 (Qld) s 8, sch 
1; Motor Vehicle Accidents (Lifetime Support Scheme) Act 2013 (SA) ss 3(1), 4; Motor Accidents (Liabilities 
and Compensation Act) 1973 (Tas) s 27A; Transport Accident Act (Vic) (n 49) s 3(1) (definition of ‘disability 
service’); Motor Vehicle (Catastrophic Injuries) Act 2016 (WA) s 6; CLA (WA) (n 51) s 13A.
54 Named after the case in which they were recognised: Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161.
142 Monash University Law Review (Vol 45, No 3)
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3% that applies at common law55 to either 5%56 or 6%,57 thus reducing damages 
awards. Some of these provisions apply only to the loss of earning capacity or 
loss of financial support,58 or apply only to the loss of earning capacity and the 
liability to incur expenditure.59
The omission from all those provisions of the loss of non-remuneration income 
might be said to indicate that the legislatures did not regard such loss as 
recoverable. However, even if that was the case (and there is no indication that it 
is), the view of a legislature as to the position of the common law does not bind the 
courts in determining that position. For example, after some courts had held that 
an injured person’s loss of the capacity to provide gratuitous services to others 
can at common law be compensated as a separate item of pecuniary loss,60 some 
jurisdictions enacted provisions limiting the availability and amount of damages 
for such loss.61 The enactment of those provisions did not prevent the High Court 
from subsequently holding that an injured person’s loss of the capacity to provide 
gratuitous services to others cannot at common law be compensated as a separate 
item of pecuniary loss.62 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ quoted Lord Reid’s 
statement that ‘the mere fact that an enactment shows that Parliament must have 
thought that the law was one thing does not preclude the courts from deciding 
that the law was in fact something different’.63 The provisions in question became 
obsolete.64
The second set of statutory provisions that might be said to conflict with an injured 
person’s right to recover for loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years are 
the provisions in the Australian survival statutes that exclude recovery by the 
estate of a wrongfully killed person for loss of earning capacity or earnings in the 
55 Todorovic (n 42). The common law rate continues to apply in personal injury cases not governed by 
legislation: Raper v Bowden (2016) 76 MVR 369, 396–9 [103]–[106] (Estcourt J).
56 CCA (n 51) s 87Y; CLA (NSW) (n 51) s 14; MAI Act (NSW) (n 51) s 4.9; Workers Compensation Act (NSW) (n 
51) s 151J; Personal Injuries Act (NT) (n 51) s 22; CLA (Qld) (n 51) s 57; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) s 61 
(‘CPA (Qld)’); CLA (SA) (n 51) s 55; CLA (Tas) (n 51) s 28A; Wrongs Act (Vic) (n 51) s 28I. All these provisions 
permit a different discount rate to be prescribed by regulations, but no such regulations have been made.
57 Transport Accident Act (Vic) (n 49) s 93(13); WIRC Act (Vic) (n 49) s 345; Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1941 (WA) s 5 (‘Law Reform Act (WA)’).
58 MAI Act (NSW) (n 51) s 4.9.
59 CPA (Qld) (n 56) s 61; Transport Accident Act (Vic) (n 49) s 93(13); WIRC Act (Vic) (n 49) s 345; Law Reform 
Act (WA) (n 57) s 5.
60 In particular Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 (‘Sullivan v Gordon’). Damages for such loss are 
therefore called Sullivan v Gordon damages.
61 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87X (now CCA (n 51) s 87X); CLA (Qld) (n 51) s 59(3), as enacted; Wrongs 
Act (Vic) (n 51) s 28ID, as enacted.
62 CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1 (‘CSR’).
63 Ibid 25 [51], quoting Birmingham Corporation v West Midland Baptist (Trust) Association (Inc) [1970] AC 
874, 898.
64 They could not be construed as providing for the availability of Sullivan v Gordon damages independently 
of the common law: Kriz v King [2007] 1 Qd R 327, 331 [12] (McMurdo P). The provisions in Queensland 
and Victoria have since been amended so as to provide for the availability of Sullivan v Gordon damages in 
certain circumstances.
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lost years.65 The purpose of these provisions is to avoid double recovery where 
the deceased has dependants who are able to obtain damages from the wrongdoer 
under legislation based on the Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (‘Lord Campbell’s Act’).66 
Where no claim was brought in the injured person’s lifetime, the dependants can 
claim damages for (among others) the loss of financial support that they would 
have obtained from the deceased in the lost years, and it is thought that this would 
overlap with a claim by the estate for the deceased’s loss of income in the lost 
years.67 If the loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years is compensable, 
the overlap described will exist, as the statutory provisions that exclude the 
estate’s claim refer only to loss of earning capacity or earnings.68
Three observations must be made. First, where the deceased would have received 
non-remuneration income in the lost years, double liability could be avoided by 
deducting, in the estate’s claim, not only the amount the deceased would have 
spent on his or her own maintenance but also the amount the deceased would have 
spent on dependants. Indeed, where the income the deceased would have obtained 
in the lost years is remuneration for work, a deduction of probable expenditure on 
dependants69 would be preferable to the current blanket exclusion of a claim by 
the estate, as the blanket exclusion deprives the estate even of the surplus income 
that the deceased would have been left with after making provision for his or 
her own maintenance and for dependants, and applies even where there are no 
dependants with a claim under an equivalent of Lord Campbell’s Act.70
Secondly, even if it is the case that the legislatures, when enacting the provisions 
mentioned, assumed that the estate of a wrongfully killed person can claim 
65 CLA (ACT) (n 51) s 16(3)(b)(ii); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW) s 2(2)(a)(ii) (‘Law 
Reform Act (NSW)’); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) s 6(1)(c)(iii) (‘Law Reform Act 
(NT)’); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 66(2)(d)(ii) (‘Succession Act (Qld)’); Survival of Causes of Action Act 
1940 (SA) s 3(1)(a)(iv) (‘Survival of Causes of Action Act (SA)’); Administration and Probate Act 1935 (Tas) s 
27(3)(c)(iii) (‘APA (Tas)’); Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) s 29(2)(c)(iii) (‘APA (Vic)’); Law Reform 
Act (WA) (n 57) s 4(2)(e).
66 9 & 10 Vict, c 93. The Australian equivalents of Lord Campbell’s Act are: CLA (ACT) (n 51) pt 3.1; 
Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW); Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT); CPA (Qld) (n 56) 
pt 10; CLA (SA) (n 51) pt 5; Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas); Wrongs Act (Vic) (n 51) pt III; Fatal Accidents Act 
1959 (WA).
67 Law Commission, Report on Personal Injury Litigation: Assessment of Damages (Law Com No 56, 24 July 
1973) 28–9 [105] (‘Report on Personal Injury’); Prue Vines, ‘Domestic Relations’ in Carolyn Sappideen and 
Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 10th ed, 2011) 737, 761 [29.200].
68 The survival statutes also provide that the damages recoverable by the estate of a wrongfully killed person 
shall be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to the estate consequent on the death, except for 
funeral expenses: CLA (ACT) (n 51) s 16(3)(b)(i); Law Reform Act (NSW) (n 65) s 2(2)(c); Law Reform Act 
(NT) (n 65) s 6(1)(c)(i); Succession Act (Qld) (n 65) s 66(2)(d)(i); Survival of Causes of Action Act (SA) (n 
65) s 3(1)(d); APA (Tas) (n 65) s 27(3)(c)(i); APA (Vic) (n 65) s 29(2)(c)(i); Law Reform Act (WA) (n 57) s 4(2)
(c). This type of provision does not exclude damages for the loss of income in the lost years. If it did, the 
provision specifically excluding recovery for the loss of earning capacity or earning in the lost years, which 
was enacted later, would be obsolete.
69 Such a deduction is not made where the claim is brought in the injured person’s lifetime: Sharman v Evans 
(1977) 138 CLR 563, 581–3 (Gibbs and Stephen JJ), 599 (Murphy J) (‘Sharman’). But Taylor J favoured 
making the deduction in a claim by the estate: Skelton (n 2) 114.
70 See Fitch v Hyde-Cates [1980] 2 NSWLR 757, 773–4 (Glass JA).
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damages only for loss of earnings, and not for loss of other income, in the lost 
years, this assumption would not bind the courts in determining the position at 
common law, as mentioned earlier.71
Finally, even if it is accepted that, in the light of the provisions mentioned, 
the estate of a wrongfully killed person should not recover for the loss of non-
remuneration income in the lost years, this would only affect claims by estates. 
It would not affect claims brought by injured persons in their lifetime. It would 
not be anomalous to exclude estate claims for an item of loss for which injured 
persons can recover in their lifetime. This difference exists for loss of earning 
capacity in the lost years (as seen)72 and in general also for non-pecuniary loss.73
In conclusion, there is no legislation that would conflict with a right of injured 
persons in their lifetime to recover for the loss of non-remuneration income in 
the lost years.
C   High Court Authority Prior to Latz
In Latz (HCA), the minority took the view that previous High Court authority 
had established that loss of earning capacity is the only financial loss resulting 
from personal injury (apart from expenses incurred and Griffiths v Kerkemeyer 
damages) that can be compensated in an action by the injured person.74 The 
statements relied upon by their Honours and other statements in the High Court 
prior to Latz (HCA) will now be scrutinised.
In Teubner v Humble, Windeyer J made the following statement:
Broadly speaking there are, it seems to me, three ways in which a personal injury 
can give rise to damage: First, it may destroy or diminish, permanently or for a 
time, an existing capacity, mental or physical: Secondly, it may create needs that 
would not otherwise exist: Thirdly, it may produce physical pain and suffering.75
In this statement, Windeyer J made no mention of the loss of non-remuneration 
income. Nor, however, did his Honour expressly exclude such loss from 
compensation. His Honour may not have contemplated such loss, in relation to 
which no claim was made in Teubner v Humble or a previous case.
71 See above nn 60–3 and accompanying text.
72 See above n 65 and accompanying text.
73 CLA (ACT) (n 51) s 16(3)(a); Law Reform Act (NSW) (n 65) s 2(2)(d); Law Reform Act (NT) (n 65) s 6(1)(c)
(ii); Succession Act (Qld) (n 65) s 66(2)(a); Survival of Causes of Action Act (SA) (n 65) ss 3(1)(a)(i)–(iii); APA 
(Tas) (n 65) s 27(3)(c)(ii); APA (Vic) (n 65) s 29(2)(c)(ii); Law Reform Act (WA) (n 57) s 4(2)(d).
74 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 10–16 [43]–[70] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
75 (1963) 108 CLR 491, 505. The statement was approvingly quoted in Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, 
248 (Brennan J).
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That Windeyer J would have recognised the loss of non-remuneration income 
as compensable loss may be gleaned from a statement of his in Skelton. After 
mentioning the compensability of expenses incurred and before dealing with 
non-pecuniary loss, Windeyer J said this:
The next rule that, as I see the matter, flows from the principle of compensation 
is that anything having a money value which the plaintiff has lost should be made 
good in money. This applies to that element in damages for personal injuries 
which is commonly called ‘loss of earnings’. The destruction or diminution of a 
man’s capacity to earn money can be made good in money.76
Windeyer J was not saying that loss of earning capacity is the only loss of benefits 
or income that can be compensated. His Honour was referring to ‘anything 
having a money value’. The Law Commission for England and Wales understood 
Skelton to support the recoverability of the loss of non-remuneration income 
such as the loss of an annuity for life.77 By contrast, the minority in Latz (HCA) 
argued that ‘[t]he decision in Skelton cannot be regarded as a signpost pointing 
the way towards recognition of a more extensive liability for economic loss than 
that which it upheld’.78 Even if this is accepted, it does not follow — contrary to 
what their Honours suggested79 — that the decision in Skelton, or the statement 
by Windeyer J quoted above, exclude recovery for the loss of non-remuneration 
income. The fact that Windeyer J made no mention of such loss is best explained 
by the absence of claims for such loss in Skelton or any previous case.
In Arthur Robinson (Grafton) Pty Ltd v Carter, Barwick CJ said that ‘it is loss of 
earning capacity and not loss of earnings that is to be the subject of compensation’.80 
His Honour merely said that where an injury affects the injured person’s 
employment prospects, it is the loss of earning capacity that is compensated, 
and the lost earnings simply provide a measure for the loss of earning capacity. 
His Honour was not concerned with the loss of non-remuneration income, 
and his statement cannot be understood as impliedly excluding such loss from 
compensation.
In O’Brien v McKean, in the context of calculating the present value of future loss, 
Barwick CJ distinguished between loss of earning capacity and the need to expend 
money in the future, and failed to mention the loss of other future benefits.81 But this 
can be explained by the fact that loss of earning capacity and future expenses were 
the only items of financial loss in respect of which a claim was made in that case.
76 Skelton (n 2) 129.
77 Report on Personal Injury (n 67) 24 [90].
78 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 14 [58] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
79 Ibid 11 [49] n 51.
80 (1968) 122 CLR 649, 658.
81 (1968) 118 CLR 540, 546–8.
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In Sharman v Evans (‘Sharman’), which involved a claim in relation to lost years, 
Gibbs and Stephen JJ said that ‘the plaintiff is to be compensated in respect of 
lost earning capacity during those years by which her life expectancy has been 
shortened, at least to the extent that they are years when she would otherwise 
have been earning income’.82 Their Honours recognised the possibility that the 
plaintiff would not be compensated for loss of earning capacity in respect of 
those lost years in which she would not have earned income had she lived. In the 
context, it is clear that by income their Honours meant remuneration for work 
done in the lost years. The denial of compensation for loss of earning capacity 
in respect of those lost years in which the plaintiff would not have exercised 
her earning capacity had she lived follows from the accepted principle that a 
diminution of earning capacity is compensated only to the extent to which it ‘is 
or may be productive of financial loss’.83 Their Honours were not concerned with 
the loss of non-remuneration income. The same is true for Mason J’s statement in 
Fitch v Hyde-Cates (‘Fitch’) that the estate of a wrongfully killed person recovers 
for loss of earning capacity, not for loss of wages.84
In CSR Ltd v Eddy (‘CSR’), Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ listed (only) 
non-pecuniary loss, loss of earning capacity and expenses incurred as the three 
categories of loss that an injured person ‘is traditionally seen as able to recover’.85 
The loss of non-remuneration income as a result of the shortening of life does 
not fall into any of the three categories.86 Mr Latz attempted to diminish the 
significance of the statement by emphasising the word ‘traditionally’. However, 
the meaning of that word must be gleaned from the context in which it was used. 
The question before the High Court in CSR was whether the loss of an injured 
person’s capacity to provide gratuitous services to others can be compensated 
as a separate head of financial loss,87 analogous to damages in respect of 
gratuitous services provided to an injured person, the availability of which had 
been recognised in 1977 in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer. In the course of denying the 
compensability of the loss of capacity to provide gratuitous services to others, 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ described Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages 
as anomalous because they are awarded in the absence of actual financial loss.88 It 
82 Sharman (n 69) 579.
83 Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340, 347 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ) (‘Graham’). See also Medlin v 
State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1, 3–5 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); 
CSR (n 62) 16 [30] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ).
84 (1982) 150 CLR 482, 498 (‘Fitch’).
85 CSR (n 62) 15–16 [28]–[31].
86 It does not fall into the third category, contrary to the view expressed by Hinton J in Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 
117 [252]. Even though Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ in CSR (n 62) used the phrase ‘actual financial 
loss’, the examples given by their Honours make clear that they were only referring to expenditure incurred: 
at 16 [31].
87 As had been held in Sullivan v Gordon (n 60).
88 CSR (n 62) 15 [27]. The High Court in CSR (n 62) stopped short of abolishing Griffiths v Kerkemeyer 
damages. As mentioned above at Part III(B), statutes in all Australian jurisdictions regulate their availability 
and amount.
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was in that context that their Honours listed the ‘traditional’ types of loss. Their 
point was that, with the exception of non-pecuniary loss, the ‘traditional’ types 
of loss all involve actual financial loss. So by ‘traditional’ they meant the types of 
loss recognised prior to Griffiths v Kerkemeyer.
Nevertheless, the statement by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ in CSR does 
not support the view of the minority in Latz (HCA). The widest proposition that 
can be derived from the statement by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ is 
that, leaving aside non-pecuniary loss, Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages should 
remain the only type of damages awarded in the absence of actual financial loss. 
That proposition does not exclude compensation for the loss of non-remuneration 
income, as such loss constitutes actual financial loss.89
Crucially, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ in CSR were not asked to, and 
did not, address the question of whether the loss of non-remuneration income 
is compensable.90 Nor did their Honours say that, leaving aside Griffiths v 
Kerkemeyer damages, the ‘traditional’ types of loss (in other words, the types of 
loss recognised prior to 1977) were the only types of loss recoverable at the time 
of their judgment (2005) or would remain the only types in the future. In 2005, 
the three types of loss listed by their Honours were not the only types of loss 
recoverable, even apart from Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages.91 In 1981, in Fox v 
Wood,92 the High Court of Australia recognised another type of recoverable loss. 
An injured worker who has obtained workers’ compensation for loss of earning 
capacity may have to repay the gross compensation out of a subsequent award 
of damages for loss of earning capacity, which are calculated by reference to 
lost net earnings.93 Fox v Wood damages compensate the injured worker for the 
shortfall.94 It might be argued that such damages are just a component of damages 
for loss of earning capacity. But the High Court in Fox v Wood saw it as a separate 
loss inflicted by tax law, and trial judges usually list Fox v Wood damages as 
an item separate from damages for loss of earning capacity.95 Thus, even apart 
from Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages, the three types of loss that Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Heydon JJ described as ‘traditionally’ recoverable were not a 
complete list of recoverable losses at the time of their Honours’ statement and 
may not have been meant to be one.
89 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 82–3 [87] (Blue J).
90 Ibid 83 [88].
91 Indeed, their Honours’ list is not even complete for the time before 1977 because it does not include the loss 
of support from a marriage which was compensated at that time: see Luntz and Harder (n 36) [4.8.4].
92 (1981) 148 CLR 438.
93 Cullen v Trappell (1980) 146 CLR 1; CPA (Qld) (n 56) s 60; Wrongs Act (Vic) (n 51) s 28A.
94 For further details, see Luntz and Harder (n 36) [4.8.3].
95 See, eg, Walker v Newlands Northern Underground Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 96, [111] (Crow J); Cootes v Concrete 
Panels (Qld) Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 146, [131] (Crow J); AEA Constructions Pty Ltd v Wharekawa [2019] 
NSWCA 176, [107] (White JA). Section 4.5(1) of the MAI Act (NSW) (n 51) also lists separately damages for 
loss of earning capacity and Fox v Wood damages.
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The final case that the minority in Latz (HCA) relied on is Government Insurance 
Office of New South Wales v Johnson (‘GIO (HCA)’).96 In the action of the estate 
of a wrongfully killed person, the trial judge found that the deceased, had he not 
died, would have received a timber mill as a gift from his father and would have 
operated it for 20 years. The judge awarded (among others) damages for the loss 
of the income that the deceased would have derived from the operation of the mill 
in the lost years. The defendant appealed the judgment, but was not contesting 
that the value of the gift of which the deceased had been deprived was in principle 
recoverable. Nevertheless, Hutley JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
expressed a view on this issue.97 His Honour made two statements. First, he said: 
‘The good fortune of a young man to have a generous father with the capacity to 
make valuable gifts is not part of his earning capacity’.98 That statement should be 
uncontroversial. Secondly, Hutley JA said: ‘The damages which are recoverable 
are for loss of earning capacity’.99 His Honour gave no further explanation and 
cited in support only the statement of Gibbs and Stephen JJ in Sharman100 referred 
to earlier.101 As mentioned,102 their Honours were not saying that of all financial 
losses resulting from a shortening of life it is only loss of earning capacity that 
can be compensated.
Government Insurance Office v Johnson (‘GIO (NSWCA)’)103 came before the 
High Court, where the defendant now did seek to challenge the award of damages 
for the loss of the gift from the deceased’s father. The High Court revoked the 
grant of special leave to appeal against this aspect of the decision, on the ground 
that the defendant had not raised the issue at the trial.104 Nevertheless, the High 
Court expressed a view on the matter. Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ, with 
whom Murphy J and Brennan J agreed, said that the trial judge had been wrong 
to award damages for the full amount of the share of the profits that the deceased 
would have obtained from the operation of the mill, and should instead have 
distinguished between a return on the capital employed in the business and a 
reflection of the earning capacity of the deceased as the manager of the business.105 
Murphy J said this:
The New South Wales’ Parliament has legislated by the Law Reform 
96 (High Court of Australia, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane, Murphy and Brennan JJ, 22 October 1982) (‘GIO 
(HCA)’).
97 GIO (NSWCA) (n 31). Glass JA, with whom Mahoney JA agreed, did not discuss this issue.
98 Ibid 627.
99 Ibid.
100 Sharman (n 69) 579.
101 See above n 82 and accompanying text.
102 See above the sentence preceding and the sentence following n 83.
103 GIO (NSWCA) (n 31).
104 GIO (HCA) (n 96). The High Court allowed the appeal against the failure of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal to apply a discount rate of 3% to the award in respect of future loss.
105 Ibid 2–3.
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(Miscellaneous Provisions) Amendment Act 1982 (No. 4) to prevent future 
claims such as this by estates of deceased persons for loss of earning capacity 
or earnings. The right to claim in this case lacked any social justification and is 
anomalous.106
What the High Court said in these statements is that the estate of a wrongfully 
killed person cannot recover for the loss of non-remuneration income. Nothing 
in the High Court’s decision indicates an intention to say anything on claims 
brought by injured persons in their lifetime. Furthermore, these statements were 
obiter dicta in a decision to revoke the grant of special leave to appeal, and are not 
binding authority.107
In conclusion, prior to Latz (HCA) there had been no statement in the High Court, 
let alone a statement carrying binding force, that unequivocally rejected the right 
of an injured person whose life expectation has been shortened to recover for the 
loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years. On the contrary, as pointed 
out by Blue J in Latz (SASCFC),108 there had been at least one judicial statement 
unequivocally endorsing the right to recover. In Fitch,109 Mason J in the High 
Court approvingly quoted what Lord Scarman had said in Gammell v Wilson 
(‘Gammell’),110 namely that the cessation of an annuity upon death is not a loss 
that the estate of a wrongfully killed person suffers consequent on the death,111 
‘for that loss, like the loss of the earnings of the lost years, is to be attributed to 
the years lost by reason of the injury sustained and is, therefore, part of the cause 
of action which vested in the deceased before his death’.112
The minority in Latz (HCA) did not regard Mason J’s statement as of particular 
relevance, for three reasons. First, their Honours said that the statement ‘was 
made in the course of the discussion by his Honour as to whether the loss of future 
receipts was compensable at the suit of the estate of the deceased rather than 
exclusively at the suit of the deceased’.113 It is true that Mason J was immediately 
106 Ibid 1. The Act cited by his Honour amended the Law Reform Act (NSW) (n 65), by inserting the present s 
2(2)(a)(ii), so as to exclude claims by estates of wrongfully killed persons for the loss of earning capacity in 
the lost years. The impact of this type of provision on the common law is discussed above at Part III(B).
107 Reasons for refusing special leave to appeal are not binding authority: Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright 
Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 104, 117 [52] (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), 133 [112] (Kiefel and 
Keane JJ), 134 [119] (Bell and Gageler JJ).
108 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 80 [77].
109 Fitch (n 84) 491.
110 [1982] AC 27 (‘Gammell’).
111 Section 2(2)(c) of the Law Reform Act (NSW) (n 65) provided that the damages recoverable by the estate of 
a wrongfully killed person ‘shall be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to his estate consequent 
upon his death’. The High Court in Fitch (n 84) held that this provision did not preclude the estate from 
recovering for the deceased’s loss of earning capacity in the lost years. The 1944 Act and the equivalent 
statutes in all other Australian jurisdictions have since been amended so as to expressly exclude estate claims 
for loss of earning capacity in the lost years: see above Part III(B).
112 Gammell (n 110) 77 (Lord Scarman). Lord Scarman was correcting what Lord Wright had said in Rose v Ford 
[1937] AC 826, 842.
113 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 16 [71] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
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concerned with a claim by the estate. But the estate can have no claim for 
economic loss suffered in the lost years that the deceased could not have brought 
in his or her lifetime. By supporting a claim by the estate for the loss of annuities 
in the lost years, Mason J necessarily supported a claim by an injured person for 
such loss.
Secondly, the minority in Latz (HCA) said that ‘Mason J was not directly addressing 
the issue whether the loss of an annuity should properly be characterised as a loss 
of earning capacity’.114 This is true, but beside the point. The point is that Mason 
J unequivocally supported a claim for the loss of annuities (as well as earning 
capacity) in the lost years.
Finally, the minority in Latz (HCA) said that ‘it is difficult to regard Mason J 
as expressing a view in support of a claim of the kind made by Mr Latz, given 
his Honour’s concurrence, a little over six months later, in reasons approving 
the view of Hutley JA in GIO v Johnson’.115 However, as seen before,116 Mason 
ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ in GIO (HCA) expressed a view on claims by estates 
and their statement is thus not inconsistent with what Mason J in Fitch — by 
necessary implication — said on claims by injured persons in their lifetime.
Stanley J in Latz (SASCFC) brushed Mason J’s statement in Fitch aside on the 
following ground: ‘Mason J did not consider the basis upon which the loss of such 
an annuity upon death might sound in damages to an injured plaintiff during his 
or her lifetime’.117 Two responses must be made. First, the basis of recovery should 
be obvious. It is the fact that the loss of non-remuneration income is generally 
compensable and that there is no reason for an exception in cases of personal 
injury. Secondly, whether or not Mason J considered the basis of recovery, the 
important point is that his Honour regarded the loss of an annuity upon death as 
compensable.
D   Policy Considerations Relating to the Loss 
of Non-Remuneration Income in General
The remaining question is whether policy considerations militate against or in 
favour of recovery for the loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years. 
The term ‘policy considerations’ is used here in a broad sense, including 
‘considerations of justice between the parties … as well as considerations of 
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 See above nn 105–7 and accompanying text.
117 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 99 [166].
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social welfare’.118 This section discusses policy considerations relating to non-
remuneration income in general and the superannuation pension in particular. 
Policy considerations relating specifically to the age pension and other income 
support will be discussed below at Part III(F).
One important policy consideration is coherence of the law.119 In particular, the 
rules applied in one area of the law must be consistent with the rules applied in 
another area of the law.120 This was accepted by all of the judges in Latz (HCA), 
but the majority and the minority differed as to whether compensation for the 
loss of superannuation payouts in the lost years would create inconsistencies in 
the law.
The minority rejected compensation for the loss of pension payments on the 
ground that
no attempt was made to explain how the failure to receive age pension or 
superannuation entitlements might be conceptualised as a form of economic loss 
distinct from the non-receipt of other forms of benefit such as legacies under a 
will or distributions under a discretionary trust …121
Their Honours seem to have assumed that the loss of those other forms of benefit 
is not compensable. The majority did not contest that assumption, and justified 
the compensability of the loss of superannuation payouts by saying that such loss 
is distinct in nature and source from the non-receipt of other forms of benefit, 
including legacies under a will or distributions under discretionary trusts. The 
superannuation pension, unlike the other forms of benefit, is a capital asset and 
intrinsically connected to earning capacity.122
Contrary to the majority’s view, superannuation payouts cannot be distinguished 
from other benefits such as legacies or trust payments on the ground that 
superannuation payouts are intrinsically connected to earning capacity, because 
they are not.123 Nor is any other reason for a different treatment obvious. However, 
118 Stephen Waddams, Principle and Policy in Contract Law: Competing or Complementary Concepts? 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 14. Some arguments discussed in this section might properly belong to 
the realm of principle rather than policy. It is not necessary for present purposes to define the demarcation 
line between policy and principle. For a general discussion, see James Plunkett, ‘Principle and Policy in 
Private Law Reasoning’ (2016) 75(2) Cambridge Law Journal 366.
119 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) 
(‘Miller’); Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498, 513 [23], 518 [34] (French CJ, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ).
120 CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390, 406–10 [39]–[42] (Gummow, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ); Miller (n 119) 454 [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
For a general discussion of the coherence and the consistency of the law, see Andrew Fell, ‘The Concept of 
Coherence in Australian Private Law’ (2018) 41(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1160.
121 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 17 [75] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
122 Ibid 23 [109] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
123 See above Part II.
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this simply means that all these forms of benefit should be treated equally. It does 
not tell us whether the equal treatment should be achieved through the award or 
the denial of compensation. Compensating the loss of non-remuneration income 
in the context of personal injury would be consistent with its compensation in 
other contexts124 and would thus ‘fit’ into the body of established rules.125
The minority in Latz (HCA) raised two further issues of potential incoherence of 
the law in relation to the loss of superannuation payouts. First, their Honours said 
that it had not been explained how defined benefit schemes should be differentiated 
from simple accumulation schemes.126 It is not clear why such a differentiation 
is necessary. The only relevant question is whether any superannuation benefits 
have been lost as a result of the shortening of the contributor’s life. Secondly, 
their Honours asked on what basis in principle a defendant’s liability should differ 
where the injured retiree had chosen to receive the superannuation entitlement in 
a lump sum.127 The answer is simple. A retired contributor who has obtained the 
entire superannuation benefit in a lump sum can no longer lose any superannuation 
benefit as a result of premature death.
Turning from coherence of the law to other policy considerations (in a broad 
sense), the majority in Latz (HCA) argued that justice demands the compensation 
of loss of superannuation payouts. Mr Latz, their Honours said, ‘will suffer an 
economic loss in respect of his superannuation pension. That loss is both certain 
and able to be measured … He should be entitled to recover that loss’.128 This 
argument is not peculiar to the loss of superannuation payouts but applies in 
principle to the loss of any type of non-remuneration income.
The minority in Latz (HCA) advanced a policy argument for excluding recovery 
for the loss of any type of non-remuneration income:
The common law of this country has not accepted that the loss of the opportunity 
to enjoy one’s financial resources by reason of premature death is a form of 
economic loss compensable as such. To accept that proposition now would be 
to accept that the loss of the capacity to enjoy one’s financial resources may be 
124 See above Part III(A).
125 It has been said that ‘[a] rule which will not “fit” into the general body of the established law cannot be 
the subject of judge-made law’: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 593 
(McHugh J). A similar statement was made in Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 115 (Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ).
126 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 17 [75] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J). An accumulation scheme exists where the employer’s 
contributions are invested and the size of the superannuation fund on retirement depends upon how 
those investments have developed. A defined benefit scheme exists where the superannuation benefits on 
retirement depend upon a certain formula which includes the total period of employment and salary levels: 
see SGAA (n 24) s 6A. On 30 June 2018, about 3% of all Australian superannuation accounts were defined 
benefit accounts: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Statistics (Annual Superannuation Bulletin, 
June 2018) 20.
127 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 17 [75] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
128 Ibid 23 [109] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).
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given a different value depending upon the value of the resources available to 
the plaintiff from whatever sources those resources may have been derived. That 
would be a departure from a position grounded in notions of equality before the 
law.129
It is difficult to accept that the principle of equality before the law would be 
violated if two persons with different amounts of non-remuneration income 
obtain proportionally different amounts of compensation for the loss of that 
income. Where the same wrongful conduct causes damage to two properties of 
different value, the owner of the more valuable property will receive a larger 
amount of damages than the owner of the less valuable property, everything else 
being equal. Nobody has argued that this violates the principle of equality before 
the law. It could in fact be argued that the principle of equality would be violated 
if both owners received the same amount of damages.130
A policy argument against the recovery for loss of non-remuneration income 
might be sought to be based on the fact that damages for personal injury are 
almost always paid out of public or insurance funds and that ‘through these 
channels the burden of compensation is spread across the whole community 
through an intricate series of economic links’.131 Where the amount people have 
to pay into the compensation fund does not depend upon wealth but the amount 
of payouts from the fund does, money is shifted from the less wealthy to the 
wealthier people in society. This is indeed a problem. But it is not confined to loss 
of non-remuneration income. It applies equally to loss of earning capacity.
Moreover, it is not for the common law to address this shift of wealth from the 
poorer to the richer by simply denying recovery for a particular type of loss, or 
placing an arbitrary cap on the amount recoverable.132 It is for the legislatures to 
address the problem. As mentioned above at Part III(B), statutes in all Australian 
jurisdictions do place a cap (the amount of which varies between the jurisdictions) 
on the amount recoverable for loss of earning capacity in certain cases of personal 
injury.133 While the introduction of the caps (and the other restrictions on personal 
injury damages) contained in the civil liability statutes was motivated by a desire 
to lessen the amount of insurance premiums, the caps do to some extent address 
the problem of funds being shifted from the less wealthy to the wealthier.
129 Ibid 18 [79] (Kiefel CJ and Keane J).
130 Corrective justice ignores the parties’ relative wealth: Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford 
University Press, rev ed, 2012) 76–80.
131 Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, 399 (Lord Hoffmann).
132 See, in a different context, Harold Luntz, ‘The Use of Policy in Negligence Cases in the High Court of 
Australia’ in Michael Bryan (ed), Private Law in Theory and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 55, 69.
133 CCA (n 51) s 87U; CLA (ACT) (n 51) s 98; CLA (NSW) (n 51) s 12; MAI Act (NSW) (n 51) s 4.6; Workers 
Compensation Act (NSW) (n 51) s 151I; Personal Injuries Act (NT) (n 51) s 20; CLA (Qld) (n 51) s 54; CLA 
(SA) (n 51) ss 54(2), (3); CLA (Tas) (n 51) s 26(1); Motor Accidents Act (Tas) (n 51) s 22(5); Wrongs Act (Vic) 
(n 51) s 28F; CLA (WA) (n 51) s 11.
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In conclusion, policy considerations militate in favour of, rather than against, the 
general compensation of the loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years. 
The specific case of the age pension and other income support will be discussed 
below at Part III(F).
E   Comparison with English Law
The argument that the loss of non-remuneration income in the lost years should in 
principle be compensable in Australian law gains support from a comparison with 
English law. In Oliver v Ashman,134 the Court of Appeal denied compensation for 
the loss of earning capacity in the lost years. This was overruled by the House 
of Lords in Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd (‘Pickett’).135 The denial 
of compensation had been defended with the argument that if loss of earning 
capacity in the lost years were compensable, the loss of other financial benefits in 
the lost years would have to be compensable as well. Addressing that argument, 
Lord Russell and Lord Scarman in Pickett said that the loss of any income in the 
lost years was compensable, not just lost earnings.136 Lord Russell mentioned 
payments out of a trust fund and an inheritance as examples.137 Lord Scarman, 
who pointed out that the question did not arise for decision,138 approvingly quoted 
what the Law Commission for England and Wales had said in 1973:
There seems to be no justification in principle for discrimination between 
deprivation of earning capacity and deprivation of the capacity otherwise to 
receive economic benefits. The loss must be regarded as a loss of the plaintiff; 
and it is a loss caused by the tort even though it relates to moneys which the 
injured person will not receive because of his premature death. No question 
of the remoteness of damage arises other than the application of the ordinary 
foreseeability test.139
Subsequently, in Gammell, Lord Scarman said in an obiter dictum that an injured 
person whose life expectation has been shortened can recover for the loss of an 
annuity ceasing on death.140 In Adsett v West,141 the estate of a wrongfully killed 
person recovered damages for the loss of an inheritance which the deceased, 
had he lived, was likely to have received. McCullough J said that he was unable 
‘to see any fundamental difference between the loss of the opportunity to earn 
134 [1962] 2 QB 210.
135 [1980] AC 136 (‘Pickett’). The action was brought by the injured person, who died during the proceedings 
before the Court of Appeal. The administratrix of the deceased’s estate continued the proceedings.
136 Ibid 165 (Lord Russell), 170 (Lord Scarman).
137 Ibid 165.
138 Ibid 170.
139 Ibid, quoting Report on Personal Injury (n 67) 24 [90].
140 Gammell (n 110) 77.
141 [1983] 1 QB 826 (‘Adsett’).
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income by work in the lost years and the loss of the opportunity to receive income 
by way of interest on an inheritance expected in the lost years’.142
Parliament intervened and abrogated claims by estates for ‘loss of income’ in the 
lost years.143 Damages for the loss of non-remuneration income have continued to 
be awarded in actions brought by injured persons in their lifetime. For example, 
in Phipps v Brooks Dry Cleaning Service Ltd,144 a person who had suffered a life-
shortening injury recovered for the loss of a retirement pension in the lost years. 
The Court of Appeal increased the award on the ground that the trial judge had 
made twice a discount for accelerated receipt. The recoverability of the loss of 
a retirement pension in the lost years was not contested.145 The Court of Appeal 
has also held that the diminution of the value of a damages claim as a result of the 
shortening of life is compensable.146
F   Policy Considerations Relating Specifically 
to the Loss of Income Support Payments
As seen before, the High Court in Latz (HCA) was split as to the question of 
whether the loss of superannuation payouts in the lost years is compensable. But 
the High Court unanimously held that the loss of age pension payments in the 
lost years is not compensable. For the minority, this followed from their Honours’ 
rejection of compensation for any pecuniary loss resulting from a shortening of 
life other than remuneration for work done in the lost years. The majority, which 
allowed compensation for the loss of superannuation payouts in the lost years, 
explained the different treatment of age pension payments in this way:
The age pension … is not part of remuneration. It is not a capital asset. It is not 
a result of, or intrinsically connected to, a person’s capacity to earn. Nor … is 
it a future income stream to which [Mr Latz] has any present or future right or 
entitlement. It is not a form of property even within the extended meaning given 
142 Ibid 848. His Lordship went on to say that it must be ignored as a coincidence that the person from whom the 
deceased was expected to inherit (the deceased’s father) belonged to the deceased’s heirs, who received the 
damages.
143 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo 5, c 41, s 1(2)(a)(ii), as inserted by 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 (UK) s 4(2). In Adsett (n 141), McCullough J seems to have taken the view 
(in obiter dicta) that ‘income’ means remuneration for work. But there is no reason for deviating from the 
ordinary, wider meaning of ‘income’.
144 [1996] PIQR Q100.
145 See also A v Powys Local Health Board [2007] EWHC 2996 (QB), [46] (Lloyd Jones J) (parties agreed on 
amount of damages for loss of pension in lost years); R v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
[2017] 1 WLR 4847, 4855 [22], 4862 [38] (Davis J) (award for loss of pension in lost years). In Hong Kong, 
the loss of old age pension payments was compensated in a fatal accident claim in Chan Yee Mei v Leung Chi 
Fei [2007] HKCFI 93, [73]–[76] (Muttrie DHCJ).
146 Haxton v Philips Electronics UK Ltd [2014] 2 All ER 225. The defendant’s negligence led to the death of 
the claimant’s husband and the shortening of the claimant’s life expectation. The claimant recovered for the 
additional amount of damages that she would have obtained in respect of her husband’s death had her life 
expectation not been shortened.
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to that concept in the application of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.147
Three observations will be made. First, it is true that the loss of age pension 
payments does not constitute loss of earning capacity. But, as seen before, 
there is no justification for confining recovery for pecuniary loss resulting from 
a shortening of life to loss of earning capacity. Secondly, it is not clear what 
their Honours meant by saying that Mr Latz did not have a present or future 
entitlement to the age pension. Any person who satisfies the eligibility criteria 
and the means test for the age pension is entitled to it. If their Honours meant to 
say that the age pension could in theory be abolished at any time, they failed to 
explain why this should be relevant. Finally, it is unclear why it should matter for 
the right to compensation whether the entitlement to an age pension is a form of 
property, whether for purposes of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution or otherwise. The 
characterisation as property does not matter in contexts in which pure economic 
loss is recoverable.
Thus, neither the majority nor the minority in Latz (HCA) gave a satisfactory 
justification for denying recovery for the loss of age pension payments as a result 
of a shortening of life.
However, a justification may be found in the fact that the age pension, like other 
types of income support,148 can be claimed by any person who satisfies the 
eligibility criteria and any means test, is not provided in return for any property 
or service provided by the beneficiary,149 and is intended to provide beneficiaries 
with ‘a minimum adequate standard of living’.150 Income support such as the age 
pension is intended to assist anyone who would otherwise fall into poverty, and 
is not intended to enhance the wealth of selected people. Any type of income 
support could be abolished at any time, subject only to constitutional restraints.
Every Australian resident enjoys the benefit of having a potential claim to income 
support should the eligibility criteria become satisfied at some stage. It is a general 
benefit flowing from the mere fact of being an Australian resident, such as the 
benefit of having roads and other infrastructure being provided, being protected 
by the army and the police, having access to a functioning court system, etc. An 
Australian resident whose life expectation is wrongfully shortened misses out on 
all these benefits in the lost years. But it has never been suggested that the loss of 
147 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 24 [115] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) (citations omitted).
148 For example, Carers Payment, Disability Support Pension, Newstart Allowance, Parenting Payments, 
Veterans Affairs Pension, Youth Allowance.
149 See Lincoln v Gravil (1954) 94 CLR 430, 437–8 (Webb J):
I do not overlook the fact that thousands of recipients of the Commonwealth pension have in 
fact contributed heavily towards Commonwealth social services; and so it is understandable 
if they do not regard the pension as benevolence. But their claims to the pension are not based 
on their contributions; they would have the same claims if they had not paid a single penny 
in contributions.
150 Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer (Report, December 2009) 485.
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such general benefits as the protection provided by the police should be reflected 
in the compensation of the loss of expectation of life, a facet of non-pecuniary 
loss.
A possible objection to this argument is that an injured person who would have 
satisfied the eligibility criteria for income support during the lost years has 
been deprived of concrete payments of calculable amount, and not just of non-
pecuniary benefits or abstract pecuniary benefits that cannot be measured. This 
is true. But it remains the fact that the injured person merely lost a benefit that is 
provided to everyone who satisfies the eligibility criteria and is only intended to 
alleviate poverty. There is thus some justification for the denial of recovery for the 
loss of age pension payments.
To be clear, the fact that income support is not paid in return for the provision 
of any goods or services by the beneficiary is not by itself decisive for the denial 
of compensation. Gifts, inheritances and distributions under discretionary trusts 
may also be obtained without the beneficiary providing anything in return. But 
these benefits are arranged (by the donor, testator, settlor or trustee) specifically 
for the beneficiary or for a selected group of people to which the beneficiary 
belongs. They are not potentially available to all Australian residents. The loss of 
such benefits as a result of a shortening of life should be compensable.
What the High Court in Latz (HCA) decided in relation to the age pension should 
apply to all types of income support. This will affect a claim by the dependants 
of a wrongfully killed person who would have received income support in the lost 
years. If income support in the lost years is disregarded in an action brought by 
the recipient himself or herself, it must equally be disregarded in determining the 
financial support that the dependants could expect in the lost years. Dependants 
who face poverty as a result of losing the deceased’s support (and not obtaining 
damages for that loss) will have their own entitlement to some kind of income 
support. Furthermore, the circumstances described should be rare, as income 
support is meant to cover just the basic needs of the recipient, who will have little 
left to spend on dependants.
If compensation for the loss of income support is unavailable where the loss 
is caused by a shortening of life, it must be unavailable whenever the loss is 
caused by personal injury. This proposition is contrary to some pre-Latz (HCA) 
authority. In Dabinett v Whittaker (‘Dabinett’),151 the plaintiff was in receipt of 
unemployment benefits when he suffered the injury caused by the defendant. As 
a result of the injury, the plaintiff’s benefit was changed to sickness benefits, the 
amount of which was repayable out of any damages he would obtain for loss of 
earning capacity. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to damages for the loss of the non-repayable unemployment 
151 [1989] 2 Qd R 228 (‘Dabinett’).
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benefits.152 The decision was applied in Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure 
Foundation Ltd (‘Renehan’),153 where the plaintiff in consequence of her injury 
received partly repayable disability support payments instead of unemployment 
benefits which she had received prior to the injury. Mildren J awarded damages in 
the full amount of the lost unemployment benefits, not just the amount repayable. 
His Honour stated the following general principle:
[I]f the plaintiff was in receipt of income by way of social security benefits prior 
to the accident which was likely to continue into the future and in receipt of a 
benefit after the accident recoverable from damages for lost earning capacity 
and the plaintiff will suffer a loss if the value of the social security benefit is not 
taken into account, damages, if they are truly restitutory [sic], should take into 
account the value of that loss.154
It might be argued that this principle merely ensures that an injured person obtains 
full compensation for loss of earning capacity, since the amount of the income 
support obtained in consequence of the injury is deducted from the amount 
awarded for loss of earning capacity. However, the deduction is offset by the 
amount of the post-injury income support. The injured person obtains the same 
amount of damages that would have been awarded if no income support had been 
paid either before or after the injury. What the injured person has really lost is the 
continuation after the time of the injury of the type of income support obtained 
prior to the injury. The damages awarded in Dabinett and Renehan were not for 
loss of earning capacity, but for the loss of income support.
The award of such damages conflicts with the argument made before that the loss 
of income support, which is available to every Australian resident who satisfies the 
eligibility criteria and any means test, should not be compensable. Moreover, the 
principle applied in Dabinett and Renehan conflicts with the decision in Latz (HCA) 
that the loss of an age pension as a result of a shortening of life is not compensable. 
A distinction between cases in which the injured person’s life expectation has been 
shortened and cases in which it has not would be formalistic and without merit.
IV   DEDUCTION OF A DEPENDANT’S 
REVERSIONARY SUPERANNUATION PENSION
Under the Australian superannuation schemes, certain dependants of a contributor 
usually become entitled to certain benefits on the contributor’s death. Where a 
contributor dies prematurely because of someone’s wrong, the dependants will 
receive their benefits at an earlier time, and (where the benefit is a periodical 
152 Ibid 229–31 (Thomas J, Andrews CJ agreeing at 228).
153 (2006) 17 NTLR 83 (‘Renehan’).
154 Ibid 119 [206]. The English Court of Appeal has applied the same principle: Neal v Bingle [1998] QB 466.
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payment for life) for a longer period, than without the wrong. The question arises 
whether this benefit must be taken into account in assessing the contributor’s 
damages for the loss of superannuation payouts in the lost years. An affirmative 
answer was given by the majority in Latz (HCA) in respect of the reversionary 
superannuation pension that Ms Taplin expected to receive after Mr Latz’s 
death (the minority did not address this issue). All that their Honours said in this 
regard is that the assessment of the loss of superannuation payouts suffered by a 
contributor to the superannuation scheme
must give credit for the value of the right which the contributor acquired when 
they became a contributor to that scheme and which remains after their death 
— a two-thirds pension to the spouse. It is an offsetting or collateral benefit.155
Two observations must be made. First, it is noteworthy that their Honours regarded 
the terms ‘offsetting benefit’ and ‘collateral benefit’ as synonyms. Previously, the 
term ‘collateral benefit’ had been used to denote either any benefit that the victim 
of a civil wrong obtains as a result of the wrong,156 or only a benefit that is not 
taken into account in assessing the victim’s damages (and thus is not offset).157 
The use of the term ‘collateral benefit’ to denote only a benefit that is taken into 
account seems to be novel and may create confusion. This is not to say that their 
Honours were wrong to apply the rules relating to the deductibility of benefits 
obtained as a result of a wrong.
Secondly, the passage quoted may be understood as saying that it is always the 
entire pension to be received by the contributor’s dependant after the contributor’s 
death which must be taken into account in assessing the loss suffered by the 
contributor. But this would only be appropriate (if at all) where, in the absence of 
the contributor’s life-shortening injury, the dependant would not have received 
any pension because the contributor would have lived longer than the dependant. 
This was not the case in Latz, where the South Australian Full Court found 
that Ms Taplin was expected to survive Mr Latz by six years even if he had 
not contracted mesothelioma.158 Where, as in Latz, the dependant would have 
survived the contributor and received a reversionary pension even in the absence 
of the contributor’s injury, the defendant’s wrong is not a factual cause of the 
dependant’s receipt of a reversionary pension. All that the defendant’s wrong 
did in those circumstances was to cause the dependant to receive the pension 
155 Latz (HCA) (n 12) 24 [112] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) (citations omitted).
156 See, eg, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Scully (2000) 201 CLR 148, 169 [33] (Gaudron ACJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Callinan JJ); James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Newton (1997) 42 NSWLR 729, 734 (Stein JA); 
Dionisatos v Acrow Formwork & Scaffolding Pty Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 34, 74 [203] (Gleeson JA); Bloomer 
v Ratych [1990] 1 SCR 940.
157 See, eg, Cade Pty Ltd v Simmons (1998) 71 SASR 571, 579, 582–3 (Williams J); Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose 
llp (in liq) [2018] AC 313, 322 [11], 322–3 [13] (Lord Sumption JSC), 349 [98] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Tiuta 
International Ltd v De Villiers Surveyors Ltd [2017] 1 WLR 4627, 4633–4 [11]–[13] (Lord Sumption JSC).
158 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 87 [111] (Blue J).
160 Monash University Law Review (Vol 45, No 3)
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in the lost years, ie, from an earlier time and for a longer period. It is only this 
benefit which is caused by the defendant’s wrong and can be taken into account 
in assessing the contributor’s loss.
In accordance with those principles, the majority in the South Australian Full Court 
did not deduct the total amount of the reversionary pension that Ms Taplin was 
expected to receive in her lifetime, but only the amount of the pension that she was 
expected to receive in the 16 years in which Mr Latz was expected to have lived in 
the absence of the mesothelioma.159 The majority in the High Court did not interfere 
with this aspect of the Full Court’s decision, and either overlooked this aspect or 
was simply imprecise in the statement quoted above. Either way, the statement 
cannot be regarded as a considered dictum to the effect that it is always the entirety 
of the dependant’s reversionary pension that must be taken into account.
Moreover, it is not every benefit resulting from a wrong that is taken into account 
in the assessment of damages. In the circumstances under discussion, it might be 
appropriate to ignore even the fact that the contributor’s dependant is expected to 
receive the reversionary pension in the lost years. This question has two aspects, 
which should be considered separately. One is the fact that the benefit is not 
received by the person who suffers the loss. The other aspect is the type of the 
benefit in comparison with other types.
Can the reversionary pension be taken into account even though it is not received 
by the person who suffers the loss? Every type of benefit that had been deducted 
from damages for personal injury or death prior to Latz was a benefit obtained 
by the person who suffered the loss: the injured person or — in an action by the 
dependants of a wrongfully killed person — a dependant. The deduction of a 
benefit obtained by a third party is a novel step. In Latz (SASCFC), Stanley J was 
not prepared to take that novel step.160
Blue J in the Full Court justified the deduction on the ground that, ‘as a matter 
of practical reality’ due to ‘the nature and longevity of Mr Latz’ relationship 
with Ms Taplin’, Mr Latz did not suffer a loss in the amount of Ms Taplin’s 
reversionary pension.161 What Blue J was saying, it seems, is that because Mr 
Latz and Ms Taplin would have continued to cohabit and pool their income in 
the lost years, it did not matter who the recipient of the pension was. While that 
argument worked for the circumstances in Latz, it would not work in cases in 
which the contributor and the dependant do not live together and do not pool their 
income. But the deductibility of the reversionary pension should not depend upon 
such coincidental matters.
159 Ibid 69–70 [38], 88 [117] n 98. The majority made no discount to reflect the chance that Mr Latz and Ms 
Taplin would have separated, regarding that chance as negligible on the facts: at 87 [112].
160 Ibid 103 [182]. The trial judge also placed some reliance on the fact that the recipient of the benefit was not 
identical with the person suffering the loss: Latz (SADC) (n 14) [112] (Gilchrist J).
161 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 88 [115].
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A better way of overcoming the fact that the benefit is not received by the injured 
person is to conceptualise a contributor’s entitlement against the superannuation 
fund as an entitlement to payouts to the contributor and/or the contributor’s 
dependants in accordance with the rules of the superannuation scheme. The 
assessment of the loss suffered by a contributor as a result of a life-shortening 
injury then involves a determination of how the entitlement just described has 
been affected. An increase in the amount payable to a dependant would offset a 
decrease in the amount payable to the contributor. An argument to this effect was 
made by Hinton J in Latz (SASCFC):
For his or her contributions the primary beneficiary not only gains a type of 
insurance for him or herself but for their dependants and spouse in the event of 
the primary beneficiary’s death. The reversionary pension is a benefit to which 
the secondary beneficiary becomes entitled but it only accrues to them through 
the primary beneficiary. It is as if the pension to which the primary beneficiary 
was entitled switched to the secondary beneficiary, albeit in a reduced amount, 
upon the death of the primary beneficiary.162
Stanley J in Latz (SASCFC) opposed this analysis by comparing a contributor 
with a dependant to a contributor without a dependant:
It would be anomalous if, by bringing to account the benefit to which Ms Taplin 
may become entitled, [Mr Latz] has his damages for the loss of pension benefits 
during the ‘lost years’ reduced where a plaintiff without a spouse would recover 
that same loss in full.163
Awarding different amounts of damages to two persons with different sets of 
circumstances is anomalous only if the differences between the two sets of 
circumstances are not relevant to the assessment of damages. In the present 
context, it is difficult to see why it should not be relevant to the assessment of 
damages for the loss of a contributor’s pension that this loss is partially or wholly 
offset by a reversionary pension obtained by a dependant of the contributor. 
What is important is that the law is consistent and that the approach of taking 
a dependant’s reversionary pension into account in determining the value of the 
contributor’s entitlement against the superannuation fund is applied not only in 
cases in which the contributor’s own pension is lost but also in cases in which the 
dependant’s pension is lost. For example, where a dependant of the contributor 
has lost the prospect of obtaining a reversionary pension after the contributor’s 
death because the contributor has been wrongfully dismissed and has ceased 
to be an active member of the superannuation fund, the contributor should be 
entitled to damages for that loss from the employer.164
162 Ibid 120 [261].
163 Ibid 103 [182].
164 This is the position in England: Fox v British Airways plc [2013] ICR 51.
162 Monash University Law Review (Vol 45, No 3)
Advance
There remains the second aspect of the question of deductibility, the type of the 
benefit. The deductibility of any benefit resulting from a civil wrong ultimately 
depends upon whether the plaintiff was intended to enjoy the benefit in addition 
to obtaining damages.165 With regard to the reversionary superannuation 
pension of a contributor’s dependants in the lost years, it must be asked whether 
the contributor was intended to enjoy the benefit of that reversionary pension 
being paid to the dependants in addition to obtaining damages for the loss of 
his or her own pension in the lost years. This will depend upon the individual 
superannuation scheme.
In Latz, the superannuation scheme had been set up by the Superannuation Act 
1988 (SA). Where statute confers a benefit resulting from a wrong, ‘[t]here are 
three possible indicia of a relevant legislative intention: the financial source of 
the benefit, the presence of a provision which requires repayment of a statutory 
benefit out of the damages awarded or paid and the nature of the benefit’.166 As 
to the first indicium, the source of the reversionary pension is the same fund 
that benefits from the premature cessation of the contributor’s pension, which 
suggests that an offset should occur. As to the second indicium, the 1988 Act does 
not require the repayment of superannuation payouts out of damages awarded,167 
which again suggests that an offset should occur.
As to the third indicium, the trial judge in Latz v Amaca Pty Ltd likened the 
reversionary pension to the payout from a life insurance policy168 and, based on 
the principle that payments from a private insurance taken out by the injured 
person are ignored in assessing damages,169 held that the reversionary pension 
was not to be deducted.170 This is not convincing. As noted by the judge,171 the 
non-deductibility of payouts from a private insurance has been justified on 
the ground that the defendant should not benefit from the plaintiff’s thrift and 
foresight.172 This argument, which is not without critics,173 presupposes that it was 
the plaintiff’s choice to take out the insurance. But it is compulsory for Australian 
employers to contribute to an employee’s superannuation fund, and while the 
165 National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569, 573 (Dixon CJ), 599–600 
(Windeyer J) (‘National Insurance Co’); Redding (n 42) 125 (Gibbs CJ), 137 (Mason and Dawson JJ), 162–3 
(Brennan J); Zheng v Cai (2009) 239 CLR 446, 453–4 [19]–[20] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and 
Bell JJ).
166 Manser (n 42) 436 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
167 For Mr Latz’s superannuation scheme, see Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 119 [258] (Hinton J).
168 Latz (SADC) (n 14) [112]–[113] (Gilchrist J).
169 National Insurance Co (n 165); Parry (n 37); Redding (n 42).
170 Latz (SADC) (n 14) [107]–[109], [114]–[115] (Gilchrist J).
171 Ibid [114].
172 Browning v War Office [1963] 1 QB 750, 763 (Donovan LJ). See also Redding (n 42) 138 (Mason and Dawson 
JJ).
173 It has been objected that the defendant does benefit from the plaintiff’s thrift and foresight where it prevents 
the occurrence of harm (eg, wearing a helmet): Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in 
Canada (Carswell Thomson, 2nd ed, 1996) 579.
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employee may have the choice between funds, there is generally no option to 
waive the dependants’ benefits under a particular scheme (and there was no such 
option in Latz).
It is more convincing to liken the reversionary pension to ‘sick pay’, as done by 
Hinton J in Latz (SASCFC).174 Under Australia’s National Employment Standards, 
full-time employees other than casuals have an annual entitlement to a minimum 
of 10 days’ paid personal leave, which includes sick leave and paid carer’s leave.175 
It means that an Australian employee continues to receive ordinary wages during 
periods of absence from work due to illness, up to 10 days per year (or the longer 
period where agreed). For this reason, the High Court has held that ‘sick pay’ 
constitutes ordinary wages and that no loss of earning capacity is suffered in 
periods of sick leave.176 If the amount of ‘sick pay’ were a certain proportion of 
ordinary wages, loss of earning capacity would be absent to the extent of that 
proportion. Similarly, the reversionary superannuation pension of the surviving 
dependant of a deceased contributor can be regarded as the continuation of the 
contributor’s own pension, in a lower amount (where applicable).
All three indicia of legislative intention thus point to the deductibility of the 
reversionary pension under the Superannuation Act 1988 (SA).177 It may be 
different for other superannuation schemes set up by statute, and where the 
superannuation scheme was not set up by statute, it is the intention of the scheme, 
as expressed in its rules, that will be decisive.
V   CONCLUSION
In the past, few people had income other than remuneration for work, and the 
potential of personal injury to cause the loss of such other income in practice was 
low. The potential has increased significantly with the creation of superannuation 
schemes and a social security system in Australia. The increase in people’s 
average life span means that a shortening of life as a result of personal injury may 
shorten the injured person’s time in retirement but not in work. Such a person may 
lose pension payments in the lost years.
It was inevitable that a case involving the loss of non-remuneration income as a 
result of a shortening of life would come before the High Court, and it did in Latz 
(HCA). While the reasons of the majority are brief and not always convincing, the 
174 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 119–20 [260]–[261].
175 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 95–9. Part-time employees have a pro rata entitlement. Agreements between 
trade unions and employers and individual employment contracts may, and often do, provide for a longer 
period of personal leave per year.
176 Graham (n 83) 345–6 (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ).
177 Latz (SASCFC) (n 15) 88 [114] (Blue J), 119–20 [258]–[261] (Hinton J). A different view was taken, without 
further explanation, in Lynch (n 10) [13]–[15] (Curtis J) for the superannuation scheme involved in that case.
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outcome can be supported.
The majority regarded superannuation payouts as intrinsically linked to earning 
capacity. This is unconvincing, as superannuation payouts merely constitute the 
fruits of earning capacity exercised in the past. But the view that the loss of 
superannuation payouts as a result of a shortening of life should be compensable 
can be supported. Economic loss in general, and the loss of non-remuneration 
income in particular, has been compensated outside the context of personal injury, 
and there is no reason of principle or policy why the loss of non-remuneration 
income should not generally be compensable where it results from personal 
injury. It might be argued that this does not sit well with statutory provisions that 
exclude or limit damages for loss of earning capacity in certain circumstances 
and should (but do not) equally apply to the loss of non-remuneration income. But 
this is no justification for creating inconsistencies within the common law. If the 
legislatures overlooked the loss of non-remuneration income as a compensable 
head of loss, they can act and amend the statutes accordingly.
In addition to the loss of a superannuation pension, the loss of other types of 
non-remuneration income, such as legacies or trust payments, should in general 
also be compensable, for the same reasons. An exception should be made for the 
loss of an age pension or of any other type of income support, as these benefits 
are potentially available to any Australian resident and are merely intended to 
alleviate poverty. Dependants of the injured person who face poverty as a result 
of the denial of compensation will become entitled to income support in their own 
right. The denial of compensation for the loss of income support should apply not 
only where the loss is caused specifically by a shortening of life but whenever it 
is caused by personal injury.
In assessing damages for the loss of a contributor’s superannuation pension in 
the lost years, account may have to be taken of a reversionary pension received 
by a dependant of the contributor in the same period. It is unusual to deduct 
from an injured person’s damages benefits received by a third party. In the 
superannuation context, the deduction can be explained by conceptualising the 
contributor’s entitlement against the superannuation fund as an entitlement to 
have payments made to the contributor and/or the dependants in accordance with 
the rules of the scheme. But there should be no deduction where the contributor 
was intended to enjoy the benefit of having a reversionary pension being paid 
to dependants in addition to obtaining damages for the loss of his or her own 
superannuation pension. Whether such an intention exists depends upon the 
individual superannuation scheme.
